We study the competitive equilibrium of large random economies with linear activities using methods of statistical mechanics. We focus on economies with C commodities, N firms, each running a randomly drawn linear technology, and one consumer. We derive, in the limit N, C → ∞ with n = N/C fixed, a complete description of the statistical properties of typical equilibria. We find two regimes, one characterized by fast expansion for n < nc = 2 and one where production processes are largely saturated by existing technologies.
Introduction
The aggregation of microeconomic behavior into macroeconomic laws is a difficult task because of the presence of heterogeneity both at the level of individual characteristics and of interactions. The paradigm of the representative agent, which essentially reduces the problem to that of a single macro individual, has shown all its inadequacy [1] , calling for alternative approaches. Computational methods -both in the spirit of agent based modeling or implementing general equilibrium theory -represent a viable substitute, rapidly growing in popularity. However these techniques provide punctual results which are difficult to generalize. While they are very useful in deriving specific results for a specific economy, they do not lead to a broad understanding.
At the other extreme, the methods of mathematical economics aim at general results -such as existence, uniqueness, efficiency -which hold for broad classes of situations. Pinning down the typical macroeconomic behavior beyond these general results is however very hard, especially when agents are heterogeneous (e.g. in their endowments, technologies, budgets, utility functions, . . . ) and are interconnected via a complex network of interactions.
Understanding the complex macro-behavior of a system does not necessarily require a detailed description of it in all its complications. Indeed many laws which govern macro-behavior have a statistical origin. E.P. Wigner [2] first had the intuition that in such cases, the collective behavior of a large system with N degrees of freedom -heavy atoms in his case -is well approximated by that of a system with random interactions in the limit N → ∞. Indeed, if the relevant properties obey laws of large numbers, then they will be substantially independent of the specific realization of the interactions when N is large. These ideas have already been exploited in the probabilistic study of typical properties of large random economies in [3] .
The statistical properties of random systems have been a central research issue in statistical mechanics for the past two decades, and extremely powerful analytical tools to calculate them have been developed. These techniques have already found a wide range of applications outside physics: among others, in combinatorial optimization problems and computer science, in the theory of neural networks, in information theory, and in agent based models [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] .
That tools developed in statistical mechanics can be useful in economic theory, is a point which has been realized several times by different authors [9, 10] . Here we propose the use of one of these for the study of the typical properties of large random production economies. The model we shall consider, outlined in detail in the next section, is based on a C dimensional commodity space and has N firms with linear technologies, as in [11] . Feasible technologies are assumed to be drawn from some probability distribution and assigned randomly to firms. Firms have to fix their scale of operations so as to maximize their respective profits. The total supply is matched to the demand of a single consumer, and the equilibrium prices, operation scales and consumptions in the limits N → ∞ and C → ∞ are determined. In the end, a complete statistical characterization of an ensemble of equilibria of large random economies is obtained. The laws we derive are statistical laws, i.e. laws that a typical realization of an economy from the ensemble will satisfy almost surely (i.e. with probability one in the limit N → ∞).
We show in particular that this approach: i) identifies the relevant macroscopic variables, the so-called order parameters, describing the behavior of the system in the limit N → ∞; ii) allows the calculation of the values of the order parameters from the solution of a "representative" firm problem, which embodies all the complexity of the full heterogeneous model; iii) enables one to derive distributions of consumption levels and of scales of activities at equilibrium. We will prove that for a broad class of choices the properties of the competitive equilibria change drastically at a critical value n c = 2 of the ratio n = N/C. At this critical value a phase transition takes place in the limiting case of efficient technologies.
One may naïvely imagine that the draw of a new technology comes as the result of technological innovation. Then our model describes structural technological progress when N increases. In other words, the variable N can be assimilated to a time variable. Whether an innovation leading to the draw of a new technology is adopted or not depends on the technologies that are already present. In this light, the sub-and super-critical phases can be viewed as regimes with different growth properties. Loosely speaking, for n < n c , innovations are easily accepted and the economy on the whole grows with n (or time). When n > n c , instead, the economy is to a large extent saturated and becomes extremely selective with respect to innovations.
After discussing the model in the next Section we present, in Section 3, the main results. In order not to obscure the emergent picture, a detailed account of the approach and of the calculation is given in the appendix. More specific and quantitative results will be discussed in Section 4.
We made an effort to keep the discussion and the mathematical complexity at the simplest level, even at the price of introducing restrictive or unrealistic assumptions. The present approach can however be easily generalized to more realistic (and more complicated) models.
The model
We consider an economy with C commodities, N firms endowed with random technologies, and one representative consumer. Firms strive to maximize their respective profits, while the consumer aims at maximizing his utility ('welfare'). The two problems are interconnected by the market clearing condition. In detail, we consider the following setup.
The company i (i = 1, . . . , N ) is characterized by a technology (or activity) with constant returns to scale that, when run at scale s i = 1 produces q c i > 0 or consumes q c i < 0 units of commodity c (c = 1, . . . , C). If the technology q i = {q c i } C c=1 is operated at a scale s i > 0, then firm i produces or consumes s i q c i units of commodity c. Technologies cannot be reversed, i.e. s i ≥ 0. Following [11] , we do not restrict our attention to Leontiev input-output models: each activity can have several outputs (joint production) and there are no primary production factors (i.e. q c i > 0 is possible for all c). As in [11] , it will be important to impose that it is impossible to produce a positive amount of some commodity without consuming a positive amount of some other commodity. A sufficient condition to ensure this is that
Here ǫ is the difference between the quantities of inputs and outputs, which measures the inefficiency of the transformation process of technology i.
is the price vector, which we assume to be non-negative. Each firm fixes s i by solving the problem max si≥0 π i
at fixed prices. The representative consumer, whose utility function we denote by U (·) and whose initial endowment we denote by x 0 , chooses his consumption x = {x c } C c=1 by solving
at fixed prices. B represents the set of consumption plans that satisfy the consumer's budget constraint.
At equilibrium, the total supply of each commodity is required to match the demand from the representative consumer (market clearing), i.e.
∀c :
The simultaneous solution of the maximization problems (2) and (3) subject to (4) constitutes the competitive equilibrium we will study in this paper.
Before specifying further our model, it is worth to make a couple of remarks. First, multiplying both sides of (4) by p c and summing over c one finds that, in equilibrium,
The last equality comes from the fact that p · (x − x 0 ) ≤ 0 because of the budget constraint and π i ≥ 0 because firms can always achieve π i = 0 by not producing. So, on one side one recovers Walras' Law p · (x − x 0 ) = 0, while on the other we find that π i = 0 for all firms. Notice also that, combining (1) with the market clearing condition we find that in equilibrium
This equation means that total equilibrium consumption will be lower than the initial one. The model thus focuses on the ability of the productive sector to provide scarce goods (with small x c 0 ) using as inputs abundant commodities (with large x c 0 ) so as to increase welfare. We assume that technologies q c i are given by
where r c i are independent Gaussian random variables, with zero mean and variance ∆/C and the last two terms enforce the constraint (1) . Appendix B shows that the assumption on the distribution of q c i can be relaxed considerably for our purposes 1 .
In what follows, we shall use the notation . . . u,v,...,z for expected values over the distributions of the variables u, v, . . . , z, but we shall omit the subscript when no confusion is possible.
Commodities are a priori equivalent. The initial endowments x c 0 are drawn at random from a distribution ρ(·), independently for each c. Furthermore we shall also suppose that
where u(·) is postulated to be increasing (u ′ (x) > 0) and convex (u ′′ (x) < 0). These assumptions, which simplify our analysis considerably, appear to be extremely restrictive. They appear less unrealistic considering, as in [12] , that x may measure desirable characteristics or properties of commodities rather than quantities thereof. In this light, the departure from Leontiev technologies with a single output becomes natural.
The key parameters of the model are thus N, C, ǫ, ∆, the distribution ρ(·) of the initial endowments, and the utility function u(·). We shall focus on the non trivial limit N → ∞ defined as
where n = N/C is held fixed as N → ∞.
A simple geometric argument, for ǫ = 0, suggest that n = 2 will play an important role. Let us write the initial endowments as constant. All the transformations take place in the space orthogonal to the constant vector: q i · x 0 = q i · δx 0 . In other words, those technologies with q i · δx 0 < 0 which reduce the initial spread of endowments δx 0 lead to a increase in wealth and hence will be run at a positive scale. Those with a positive component along δx 0 will have s i = 0. Given that the probability to generate randomly a vector in the half-space {q : q · δx 0 < 0} is 1/2, when N is large we expect N/2 active firms. Still the number of possible active firms is bounded above by C, hence when n = N/C = 2 the space of technologies becomes complete and x c =x 0 ∀c. There is no possibility to increase welfare further. We shall see below that n = 2 separates two distinct regimes of equilibria even with ǫ > 0. It is easy to see that the problem of finding equilibrium prices, production scales and consumption levels of the economy in the above setting is reduced to the following:
Given the solution {s * i } to this problem, the equilibrium consumption levels are given by the market clearing condition (4) and the (relative) prices are derived from marginal utilities as 2
Eq. (10) is a typical problem in statistical mechanics. The general approach to this type of issues is discussed in Appendix A. Equilibrium quantities are random variables because of the randomness in the technologies q i and in the initial endowments x 0 . Still there are statistical properties of the equilibrium which hold almost surely in the limit (9) . These will be the subject of our interest. In Section 3, we present the general solution, while in Section 4 we shall specialize to more concrete examples. The reader interested in technical details is referred to the appendices for a detailed account of the method and of the explicit calculation.
The solution
As shown in appendices A and B, the solution of the equilibrium problem (10) in the limit N → ∞ with n = N/C fixed is given by
where h(Ω, κ, p, σ, χ,χ) = max
and Ω * , . . . ,χ * are the saddle point values of the parameters, i.e. those which solves the system of equations ∂h ∂Ω = 0, . . . , ∂h ∂χ = 0. The variables Ω, κ, p, σ, χ,χ are called order parameters in statistical physics 3 . They emerge from the analytic approach (see appendices A and B) as the key macroscopic variables which describe the collective behavior of the equilibria.
In Eq. (13) t is a Gaussian r.v., with zero mean and unit variance and as usual . . . t , . . . t,x0 stand for expectation values on t and on t and x 0 , respectively. The precise derivation of this result is described in Appendix B.
The structure of h is reminiscent of the original problem. The first term on the r.h.s. can indeed be regarded as the profit maximization of a "representative" firm. The variable s is indeed one of the variables s i which appear in the original problem (10) . The solution of the maximization problem in the first term of Eq. (13) is given by
Since t is a random variable, s * is also a random variable and its probability density can be derived from that of t. The result is
where Θ(s) = 0 for s ≤ 0 and Θ(s) = 1 for s > 0. The variable s is the scale of production of a (representative) firm, hence (15) yields the distribution of s i in the economy and φ is the fraction of technologies that are active (i.e. such that s i > 0). Likewise, the last term on the r.h.s. of Eq. (13) is related to utility maximization with respect to a "representative" commodity. The variable x is indeed one of the variables x c which appear in the original problem. The solution of this problem is given by
which is always positive provided u ′ (x) → ∞ for x → 0. The probability density of x c in the economy can be derived from that of t and x 0 in the same way as above for the scale s i of production. The conditional probability of x c given x c 0 is computed in Appendix C. The result is
Hence the variable x − χu ′ (x) has a Gaussian distribution with mean x 0 − κ and variance n∆Ω.
The two "representative" problems are coupled in a nontrivial way through the other terms in (13) .
The structure of the solution becomes more clear if we analyze the set of saddle point equations ∂h ∂Ω = 0, . . . , ∂h ∂χ = 0, with θ = (Ω, κ, p, σ, χ,χ). After some algebra (see appendix B), these can be cast in the following form:
The first of these equations relates the parameter p to the average (relative) price because of (11), while the third one implies that σ is a measure of price fluctuations 4 . Using these relations (see appendix D for details) one finds that at the saddle point
This is indeed what we expect looking at the original problem (10) . Furthermore, taking the expected value of (16) and combining it with (18) and (23) yields
which is exactly Eq. (6). Finally, it is possible to show (see Appendix D) that Eq.s (18-23) also "contain" Walras' law in the form
The dependence on ∆ of the solution can be clarified by a rescaling argument: changing variables to p ′ = p, χ ′ =χ/∆, σ ′ = σ/ √ ∆, Ω ′ = ∆Ω, χ ′ = χ and κ ′ = κ one finds that the solution only depends on the parameter ǫ ′ = ǫ/∆. Hence the behavior of the solution with respect to ∆ is easily related to the dependence on ǫ with ∆ = 1. Notice that, a dependence on ∆ remains after the change of variables in the distribution of s i , Eq. (15). This means that production scales satisfy the scaling relation
The behavior of the solution when the spread of the initial endowments δx 2 0 ≡ (x 0 − x 0 ) 2 is very small can be computed with asymptotic expansion methods. The key observation in the expansion (see appendix E) is that x * also has very small fluctuations. This, in turn, implies that prices also have very small fluctuations, indeed σ ∼ = |u ′′ ( x 0 )| δx 2 0 . The scales of production also vanish when δx 2 0 → 0, but with a singular exponential behavior. E.g.
for some constant A. Hence we find that no economic activity takes place (φ → 0, Ω → 0, s * t → 0) in the limit of uniform endowments. This is what one should expect from the beginning (see Appendix E for more details).
A further interesting limit, for which we can derive generic results, is that of vanishing ǫ. Setting ǫ = 0 in the above equations one finds in a straightforward way that Ω = σ 2 /(2χ 2 ), χ = n∆/(2χ) and k = pχ. Eq. (7) yields φ = 1/2 which means that half of the firms are active, in agreement with the geometric argument of the previous section for n < 2. When n → 2 − the equations develop a singularity:
A detailed account is given in Appendix F. The case n > 2 is more subtle as it requires a careful asymptotic study of the limit ǫ → 0 where again realizing that x * has small fluctuations of order ǫ is crucial. The bottom line is that (see appendix F for details) price fluctuations vanish linearly with ǫ, i.e. σ ∝ ǫ but alsoχ ∝ ǫ so the factors ǫp/χ and σ/χ in Eq. (14) are finite. Hence scales of productions remain finite, as ǫ → 0 and they diverge when n → 2 + as s * ∝ 1/ √ n − 2. The fraction of active firms turns out to be φ = 1/n, which means that there are exactly C firms operating.
Eq.s (24), (25) and (26) show that the saddle point equations, which represent the simplest mathematical description of the random economy in its full complexity, manage to capture in a compact, though somewhat intricate, way the basic properties of the economy. This is a useful consistency check. The best way to unravel the resulting behavior beyond these generic laws is however to specialize to particular cases.
Discussion
In this section we display the behavior of the solution outlined in the previous section for some particular choices of the functions u(x) and ρ(x 0 ). In spite of their apparent complexity, Eq.s (18-23) can be solved numerically to any desired degree of accuracy. Using the scaling argument above, we can safely restrict ourselves to study the dependence on ǫ setting ∆ = 1, without any loss of generality.
We shall henceforth set
We start our discussion from the case ρ(x 0 ) = e −x0 , x 0 ≥ 0. (30) Fig. 1 compares the numerical solution with computer experiments. We generate many realizations of the random economy and compute numerically the equilibria for each of them. The analytical results we obtain in the limit C → ∞ turn out to give a quite accurate description of the behavior of relatively small systems 5 (i.e. C = 16) even for a single realization. We find it suggestive to discuss the results as a function of n = N/C so that the entry of new firms, eventually because of technological innovation, corresponds to an increase of n 6 . Fig. 1 shows that there are essentially two different regimes. For n < n c = 2 roughly half of the firms are active, whereas for n ≫ n c the number of active firms saturates to C. Contrary to the situation where n < n c , the regime n > n c is highly selective for firms as also shown by the increase of relative fluctuations of scales.
The transition between the two regimes becomes sharper when ǫ decreases and it gives rise to a singularity in the limit ǫ → 0, as we have seen in the previous section. This is clearly visible in Fig. 2 , where we plot the behavior of various quantities as a function of n for different values of ǫ.
For n < n c the average scale of production s * increases with n. This means that, in this region, existing firms benefit from the entry of a new technology (positive spill-overs). For n > n c , instead, the entrance of a As n increases relative price fluctuations decrease. But the decrease becomes very sharp close to n c for ǫ ≪ 1. In this case, at n c price fluctuations suddenly drop to a level close to zero. This is related to the behavior of the variable x * shown in the right panel of Fig. 2 . In the region below n c the average consumption level decreases. In this region firms take advantage of the spread
between scarce and abundant goods to make a living. But as n approaches n c , the spread in x quickly drops to a very low value, making life more difficult. For n > n c the economy is very selective toward more efficient technologies which can perform the desired transformation between commodities with a smaller decrease in the average level x of consumption. This is clearly shown in Fig. 3 where we plot the probability densities of x for three different values of n = 0.5, 2 and 5. The right plot shows that while for n = 0.5 the distribution P (x|·), Eq. (17), retains the character of the distribution of initial endowments ρ(x 0 ), it becomes more and more peaked around x 0 as n increases. At the same time the distribution of s, Eq. (15), becomes broader and broader.
A very similar behavior is found for different distributions ρ(x 0 ) of initial endowments. Fig. 4 shows the results obtained with
This captures the situation where only a fraction f of the commodities is present in initial endowments (primary goods) whereas the remaining commodities have to be provided by the productive sector. The behavior of φ, x * and relative prices is very similar to that found for the previous model. Fig. 4 shows that the average scale of production and the relative fluctuations of x c show a qualitatively different behavior. Again the two regimes with clearly distinct properties can be identified for n < n c and n > n c .
Conclusions
Summarizing, we have addressed the problem of calculating the general equilibria of large linear production economies with random technologies and a single consumer with tools of statistical physics. In a nutshell, our results can be stated as follows. When the ratio n of the number of firms (or technologies) to the number of commodities is below a threshold n c = 2, the average operation scale grows as n increases and roughly one-half of the firms are active. Above n c , instead, the economy becomes extremely selective. The production sector is saturated, i.e. the number of active technologies converges to the number of commodities, and new technologies are accepted only at the expense of reducing the operation scales of the other technologies. The transition becomes more and more sharp as the ǫ, measuring the inefficiency of each technology, approaches zero. From the consumer's viewpoint, welfare increases with n in both regimes. However for n < 2 the dominant contribution comes from new technologies which can exploit the unevenness of initial endowments and produce scarce goods using abundant ones. For n > 2 welfare increases is mostly due to the "discovery" of technologies which replace existing ones, being more efficient.
Assuming that technological innovation leading to new activities occur at a given rate, one can consider n as a time variable. In this light, one can conclude from our results that early stages of industrial development (n < n c ) are characterized by a fast expansion where innovations are easily accepted and have positive spillover effects on already operating ones. This regime (n < n c ) is reminiscent of fast economic growth driven by technological innovation such as the one experience by many western countries after the second world war.
For larger times the economy enters a mature phase of development (n > n c ), growth slows down and most innovations are rejected. The productive sector is characterized by strong competition as the adoption of a new technology typically leads to the reduction in the scale of operation of other technologies. The disappointing missed growth of high tech companies in the .com bubble seems to fit this generic scenario.
Welfare levels grow with n either because the spread in consumption levels δx decreases as abundant commodities are transformed in scarce ones for n < n c , or because more efficient technologies, granting an increase in the level of consumption, are introduced. The distribution of firm sizes (i.e. of their scale of operation) instead gets broader and broader as n increases. Interestingly most developed countries are characterized by a very broad distribution of firm sizes. A further element in the direction of our thesis, is that the distribution Q(s) gets broader as n increases. Interestingly mature economies, such as Japan [13] or the US [14] , are characterized by a very broad distribution of firm sizes, which we can put in relation with Q(s). The shape of the distribution found empirically is close to a power law, which is different from (15) . However, it is not difficult to derive a power law distribution of s relaxing the unrealistic assumption that all firms have the same value of ∆ and ǫ 7 . Our model clearly is unrealistic in many respects. Still it may capture some novel aspects of structural economic growth driven by technological innovation. 7 As discussed above (see Eq. (27), the dependence on ∆ drops out of the equations if we consider parameters appropriately rescaled with ∆ and a variables i = √ ∆s i . It follows that the equilibria of an economy where ∆ i is randomly drawn from a distribution g(∆) and ǫ i = ǫ ′ √ ∆ i is described by the same equations, in terms of the variables. In order to compute the distributioñ Q(s) of the original variables s i , we first use Eq. (27) in order to compute the conditional distributionQ(s|∆) = √ ∆Q( √ ∆s), where Q is given in Eq. (15) . Then we take the average over ∆
The large s behavior of the distribution of s is related to the behavior of g(∆) for small ∆. If g(∆) ≃ ∆ γ for ∆ ≪ 1, then we find a power law behavior Q(s) ≃ s −3−2γ for s ≫ 1.
Above all, we propose the use of statistical mechanics of disordered systems to study the typical properties of the general equilibria of large random economies. We have shown how these methods are able to deal effectively with heterogeneity, providing a complete statistical description of the equilibria, which is consistent with generic results. The relevant quantities -called order parameters -are naturally identified by the method. Given the non standard type of the calculations involved, we also present computer experiments which convincingly support our results.
The approach generalizes in a straightforward way to more complex situations and we hope that this work will stimulate cross-fertilization between the fields of economic theory and statistical mechanics.
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Appendices

A The method
The standard technique to maximize a function of N variables with N → ∞ in statistical mechanics relies on the well-known steepest descent, or saddle point, method. Let H N (·) be an extensive 8 function of s = {s i } N i=1 , and imagine that we want to compute the maximum value of H N (s)/N in the limit N → ∞. Then
is called the partition function associated to H N . Here ds stands for an N -dimensional integral on the whole domain of definition of s. The idea of (35) is that the integral for β ≫ 1 is dominated by regions where H N is maximal. This recipe turns the problem of maximizing h into that of calculating Z N and evaluating the asymptotic behavior of its logarithm. This task becomes much more difficult when H N depends on a set of random variables q with probability density p(q). We denote this dependence by H N (·|q). The generic situation is that q enters the definition of the interactions among the N components of s and H N is a sum over all interaction terms. In such situations, we expect that a sufficiently regular H N will obey the law of large numbers, so that e.g lim N →∞
In other words, max H N /N is expected to be a self-averaging quantity, namely to have vanishing sample-tosample fluctuations in the limit N → ∞. If one wanted to generalize (34) to the evaluation of (36), one would have to compute the q-average of the logarithm of the partition function Z N (β|q). Unfortunately, the logarithm prevents every useful factorization of such an average and makes this way impracticable. The replica method is the standard statistical mechanical technique to circumvent this difficulty. Using the formula log Z N (β|q) = lim 
which is the partition function of r "replicas" of the original system with the same disorder realization q (hence the name of the method). The last step consists in performing an analytic continuation for real values of r and taking the limit r → 0:
The existence and uniqueness of the limit r → 0, which looks somewhat bizarre, have been much debated in the physics literature (see [15] for a discussion). Even if this method remains a formally non-rigorous procedure, several rigorous mathematical results confirm its validity in problems that are more complex that the one we deal with here [16, 17] . We hope this (together with the agreement with computer experiments) gives the reader a sufficient level of confidence to accept the r → 0 passage. The technical part of the calculation lies in the introduction of a finite number of auxiliary integration variables θ = {θ 1 , . . . , θ k } allowing the averaged replicated partition function to be re-cast in the form
where h(·) is some function and o(r, β, ·) → 0 in the limits β → ∞, r → 0. The θ variables are called order parameters. Their nature and number are dictated by the mathematical structure of the problem (see Appendix B for the details of our case). Finally, assuming that the limits r → 0 and N → ∞ commute, the latter can be taken first in (39) thus allowing to evaluate (40) by the saddle-point method as
where θ * is the saddle point value of θ which dominates the integral in (40). Hence, putting things together,
The core of the procedure lies in (40) where, by a lengthy calculation one identifies the relevant order parameters θ and the function h. This crucial but technical step is presented below (appendix B) for our problem.
B The explicit calculation of the representative agent problem
The partition function in our case reads
with U (x) the utility function of the representative consumer. As stated above, in order to analyze the statistical properties of the equilibria we have to evaluate [Z N (β|q)] r q and resort to (39), with H N given in our case by U and with all the necessary constraints. Before proceeding, we shall introduce some useful definitions and identities. The first one is the δ-function δ(x) which is defined through the relation
for any function f (·) and y ∈ R. We will also use the exponential representation of the δ-function
. Another mathematical tool we will use is the Gaussian or Hubbard-Stratonovich transformation, viz.
which allows to linearize arguments of exponentials at the cost of introducing averages over Gaussian r.v.'s. Now, in order to perform our calculation it is convenient to replace the consumption variables x by writing explicitly the market clearing condition (4) in the partition function (43). To do so we use the defining property (44) of δ-distributions and write
As already explained in Sec. A we will have to take the following steps: (a) average the partition function of r replicas over technologies, as in (40); (b) identify the correct order parameters of the problem to write the latter average as in (40); (c) take the limits N → ∞ and r → 0; and finally to get something of the form of (42); and finally (d) find the values of the order parameters at the competitive equilibrium (i.e. when β → ∞).
The partition function of r replicas reads
Notice that the dependence on the technologies appears in the market clearing condition only, so that the average . . . q involves only the last part of [Z N (β|q)] r . This average one must take into account the constraint (1), i.e.
where · · · ′ q stands for the average over unconstrained i.i.d. Gaussian vectors q with zero mean and variance q 2 q = c (q c ) 2 q = ∆. Using Eq. (45) for the constraints, the denominator becomes
while for the numerator we get
x c a s i,a 2 (51)
Notice that the expected values involved in these calculations are all of the form ψ(y) = e iyq c i q . This is the characteristic function of q c i and for the assumed Gaussian distribution it takes the form ψ(y) = e −∆y 2 /(2C) . This assumption can however relaxed to any distribution of q c i with ψ(y) =ψ(y/ √ C) with a leading behavior ψ(x) = −∆x 2 /2 + O(x 3 ). Indeed all higher order terms in the power expansion ofψ give vanishingly small contributions with respect to the first, in the limit C → ∞.
Gathering all the terms, we have
In order to write the above in a form as simple as (40), the set of order parameters to be introduced must allow for a decoupling of the integrals over the variables z i , s i,a and x c a in such a way that the integrals on the different variables can be factorized. Here it is enough to introduce the following order parameters
through identities such as
Then last term in the exponent of the numerator of Eq. (53) becomes
This allows us to separate the problem into three parts. Indeed we can re-cast the replicated partition function in the form of a set of integrals over the order parameters:
where h = g 1 + g 2 + g 3 is the sum of three terms which can be computed independently. In particular
k a k a (58)
x a x b ω ab + n∆ r a=1
x a k a (60) with n = N/C. The order parameters k a have appeared after using an identity similar to (55) for k a . Now (57) is precisely of the form (40).
In the limit N → ∞ the integrals appearing in (57) are dominated by the contributions coming from the saddle-point of h and the solution of our specific problem can be written as
where the * means that parameters take their saddle point value, i.e. those who solve the system of equations
for all a, b = 1, . . . , r. Ideally one should first solve these equations for generic r and then take the limit r → 0. A word about the meaning of the order parameters introduced thus far is in order before taking the limit r → 0. Indeed, ω ab is an r × r matrix for integer r, but it is not clear how can we handle it in the limit r → 0. When we replicated the partition function passing from (43) to (48) we essentially passed from a problem in which U (x a ) is to be maximized to an equivalent problem in which a U (x a ) is to be maximized. The latter sum is evidently left unchanged by a permutation of the replica indices 1, . . . , r. Hence it must be expected that, as long as there is a unique maximum (as in this case), replica permutation symmetry is preserved also by the solution of Eq.s (62). Then we expect a solution of the form
This is the so-called replica-symmetric Ansatz, which simply expresses the conservation of the permutation symmetry. When multiple maxima with different statistical properties exist, this Ansatz fails because replicas can converge to maxima with different properties, and hence replicas are no more equivalent. This situation is ruled out in our case by the nature of the function we want to maximize. With Eq.s (63), it is easy to find an analytic expression of the function g 1 , g 2 and g 3 in terms of r and to perform the limit r → 0. Substituting (63) into the definitions of g 1 , g 2 and g 3 , after some straightforward algebraic manipulations one finds
We must finally evaluate the limit β → ∞. In this limit, a somewhat special role is played by the quantity χ = β(Ω − ω). Notice that
is the distance between two replicas. The two vectors s a and s b both converge to the unique solution of the maximization problem as β → ∞. Hence, we also expect the distance Ω − ω to vanish in this limit. But looking e.g. at W/β one realizes that in order to avoid annoying divergences or trivial limits this quantity must vanish in such a way that the product β(Ω − ω) stays finite. In other terms, one wants that Ω − ω ∼ 1/β for large β.
If this is the case, the maximization problem has a well-defined solution. Hence we assume that lim β→∞ χ is finite. Similar arguments lead to the introduction of the following re-defined order parameters, which remain finite as β → ∞:
Inserting these in the previous expressions we find that h can be written as
where now the functions V and W read
We neglected the last term in W because it is vanishingly small in the limit β → ∞ when χ is finite. When β → ∞, again by steepest descent reasoning, only the maxima of V and W contribute to the integrals over s and x. Therefore we can write the final expression for h as
The difference between this expression and the one appearing in (13) is again a trivial redefinition of the order parameters. If we let now x * (t, x 0 ) and s * (t) be the values maximizing the functions W and V , respectively, and therefore given by (14) and (16), we can then expand (75) to obtain
The last step is to derive the saddle-point equations from which the values that the order parameters take on at equilibrium can be calculated. Computing the derivatives of h with respect to the order parameters we get
(77)
Using the relation (16) and setting p = − κ, σ = γ − ∆ κ 2 we finally arrive at Eq.s (18-23).
C The p.d.f.'s of s and x
We illustrate here the procedure for calculating the conditional probability density of x (the equilibrium consumption) given x 0 (the initial endowment). The derivation of the distribution of s follows exactly the same lines. One can start from the identity
Then one can make use of the property δ(x − x * ) = |f ′ (x * )|δ[f (x)], where f (x) is a function with an unique root in x * . From (16) , we take
From this, taking the integral over t, one immediately finds (17) .
D Calculation of h at the saddle point and derivation of Walras' law
Substituting s with s * (t) (14) and x with x * (t, x 0 ) (16) we can re-write h as
Now it's a simple algebraic problem. For the first term on the r.h.s. we use (22); for the second and the fifth we use (23); the third and fourth cancel because of (21); finally for the last term we use (16) and then (20) to find, finally,
(24) follows immediately. In order to derive Walras' law, we note that when computing s * t t , one can make the substitution t = (χs * + ǫp)/σ (which is only valid when s * > 0). Then (22) becomes
where we have used (23) in the last equality. Likewise, we can substitute t in the average of (19) by solving (16) for t. This yields
which can be substituted back in (88). This yields the desired result (26).
E Almost uniform initial endowments
In this section we study the limiting behavior of the economy when the spread of initial endowments is vanishingly small. In particular we show that when the initial distribution of endowments becomes uniform the volume of productive activity vanishes. We take ∆ = 1 for simplicity. We take x 0 = x 0 + δx 0 , with x 0 a fixed value and δx 0 a small random variable, and discuss the solution to the leading order in δx 2 . Then, taking x * = x 0 + δx * we can write, to leading order in δx 0 and δx *
From here we can identity the zero and first order terms in δx * , viz. 
Using asymptotic expansion for I(τ ) one finds that the leading order behavior of Ω is (99)
With these we finally getχ ∼ = |u ′′ (x 0 )| and σ = |u ′′ (x 0 )| δx 2 0 x0 . Therefore when the fluctuations of the initial endowment vanish there is no market activity.
F Limit ǫ → 0
Setting ǫ = 0 the averages over s * (t) become trivial and Eq.s (21,22) and (23) are easily evaluated. Progress with the other equations is possible, for generic u(x) and ρ(x 0 ), close to n = 2. Then we expect that the consumption vector x is nearly constant. Then, as in the previous case, we assume x * = x 0 + δx * with δx * small. Then p = u ′ ( x 0 ) as before. Using the expressions for Ω, χ and κ and expanding Eq. (16) to linear order as above, we find the expression
where u ′′ = u ′′ ( x 0 ). This allows us to compute u ′ (x * )t ∼ = u ′′ tδx * and hence to evaluate Eq. (19):
Likewise we can evaluate Eq. (20) and find σ = |u ′′ | ∆(1 − n/2). Using these in Eq.s (14, 21) we find the divergence of Ω ∼ = 1/(2 − n). This solution breaks down for n > 2. We need to take the limit ǫ → 0 carefully into account. Again we anticipate that the spread δx * will be small. More precisely we assume that σ andχ vanish linearly with ǫ and set s 0 = σ/χ and σ = dǫ and look for a solution with finite s 0 and d. 
Note that Eq. (103) implies that d → ∞ as n → 2 + . The leading behavior is d ∼ = 2 π pn 2−n . In the same limit I(p/d) → 1/2 which means that s * ∝ s 0 ∼ 1/(n − 2) also diverges as n → 2 + matching the divergence for n → 2 − .
